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NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISIONS: 1993 COMPILATION
APPORTIONMENT
N.Y. CoNsT. art. II § 4:
For the purpose of voting, no person shall be deemed to have
gained or lost residence, by reason of his presence or absence,
while employed in the service of the United States; nor while
engaged in the navigation of the waters of this state, or of the
United States , or of the high seas; nor while a student of any
seminary of learning; nor while kept at any almshouse, or by
charity; nor while confined in any publicprison.
COURT OF APPEALS
Longway v. Jefferson County Board of Supervisors 1
(decided December 16, 1993)
The New York Court of Appeals unanimously answered a
certified question from the Federal Court of Appeals, Second
Circuit, indicating that the use of the term "population" in the
Municipal Home Rule Law Section 10 (1)(ii)(a)(13)(c) does not
necessarily exclude transient residents including military

1. 83 N.Y.2d 17, 628 N.E.2d 1316, 607 N.Y.S.2d 606 (1993).
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personnel and their dependents, incarcerated felons, and
2
occupants of group homes.
The action was first brought in the Federal District Court for
the Northern District of New York pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. 3 The plaintiffs, members of the Jefferson County Board
of Supervisors and a resident of Jefferson County who was not
part of that board, sued on behalf of several towns and wards of
the city of Waterford. 4 The plaintiffs requested that the federal
court compel Jefferson County to adopt an apportionment plan
that conformed to constitutional requirements. They alleged that
the current plan which was based upon 1990 Federal Census
data, impermissibly counted transient non-residents in population
totals used by the county to form their electoral districts. 5 This,
the plaintiffs contend, diluted the vote of the residents of
Jefferson County thus violating their constitutional right to equal
protection under the law. 6 The federal district court granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment, dismissing the
plaintiff's complaint and the plaintiffs appealed to the court of
appeals. 7 That court in turn determined that the federal
constitutional issues indicated in the case might be rendered moot
once the statutory construction was interpreted by the New York

2. Id. at 19, 628 N.E.2d at 1316, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 606. The New York
Court of Appeals was able to accept such a certified question upon the
authority of title 22 of the New York Code of Rules and Regulations § 500.17,

which allows the United States Supreme Court or Federal Courts of Appeals or
other courts of last resort to certify "determinative questions of New York
law ... for which there [are] no controlling precedent of the Court of
Appeals." Id. at 20, 628 N.E.2d at 1317, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 607; see also N.Y.
COMP. CODES R.& REGS. tit. 22, § 500.17(a) (1990).
3. Longway v. Jefferson County Bd. of Supervisors, 995 F.2d 12 (2d
Cir. 1993).
4. Id. at 14.
5. Id.
6. Id.The plaintiffs rely on both a federal constitutional argument and

state statutory arguments. Id.
7. Longway v. Jefferson County Bd. of Supervisors, 83 N.Y.2d 17, 20,
628 N.E.2d 1316, 1317, 607 N.Y.S.2d 606, 607 (1993).
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Court of Appeals and certified the question which is the subject
8
of this New York Court of Appeals decision.

The question certified by the Second Circuit was: "Whether,
for purposes of local legislative apportionment, "population,"
defined as "residents, citizens, or registered voters," New York
Municipal Home Rule Law, necessarily excludes transients, such

as military personnel, incarcerated felons, and occupants of
group homes." 9
The New York Court of Appeals approached the question by
first reviewing the federal case law which informs all
apportionment and redistricting processes of constitutional
guidelines. Recalling Reynolds v. Sims 10 and its progeny, the
Longway court reviewed the "one man, one vote" doctrine which
states that the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause
requires that all law making bodies be comprised of
representatives who represent substantially equal populations. 1 1
8. 995 F.2d at 14-15. The Second Circuit concluded that the issue was
ripe for review. Id. at 13. The court further determined that a certified
question was necessary because whatever plan Jefferson County, a local
governmental structure, finally put into place it would be a plan which relied
upon the definition of "population" as the New York Municipal Home Rule
Law included that term. It is the state legislature's policies and laws which
govern the permissibility of different methods of apportionment and districting
plans, so long as these plans remain within the boundaries of what it acceptable
under the federal constitution. The issue presented in the instant case
concerning the definition of population for purposes of apportionment was
likely to reoccur, thus the federal appeals court certified the question to the
highest state court. Id. at 15.
9. Id. at 14.
10. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
11. 83 N.Y.2d at 21-22; see also Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474
(1968). The court held that the one man, one vote principle enunciated in
Reynolds must be extended to all local governing bodies which command
general governmental functions, thus allowing novel forms of local government
with the only constitutional restriction being that all who are governed must
retain an equal voice in the representative process. Id. at 481-82. lannucci v.
Board of Supervisors, 20 N.Y.2d 244, 229 N.E.2d 195, 282 N.Y.S.2d 502
(1967). The lannucci court held that the one man, one vote rule created by
Reynolds, and extended to local governments in Avery, was applicable to
county level supervisory boards. Id. at 249, 229 N.E.2d at 197, 282 N.Y.S.2d
at 506. The court concluded that county governmental boards had to be elected
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The Longway court further reiterated the Supreme Court's
advisory in Avery v. Midland County12 that "indicated that 'the
Constitution does not require that a uniform straightjacket bind
citizens in devising mechanisms of local government suitable for
13
local needs and efficient in solving local problems.'
From the federal and state precedents addressing the issue of
apportionment, the Longway court extrapolated a theme of
flexibility within constitutionally permissible perimeters. 14 The
court stated that the Municipal Home Rule which it here
undertook to interpret "embodies the sentiment of the Supreme
Court that flexibility is key ... . "15 With this said, the Longway
court continued to recount that neither in Reynolds, nor in any
other apportionment case had the Supreme Court ever held that
aliens, transients, temporary residents, or felons denied the right
to vote had to be necessarily included in the population count
upon which electoral districts are drawn in order to satisfy the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 16 In the
absence of any constitutional requirement, the court expressed the
belief that such a determination of exclusion or inclusion is one
left to the wisdom of state legislatures.17 This assertion was
supported by the Supreme Court's holding in Burns v.
Richardson1 8 where the court stated that "[t]he decision to
include or exclude any such group involves choices about the
nature of representation with which we have been shown no
constitutionally founded reason to interfere. Unless a choice is
using districts which were apportioned based upon substantially equal
populations, and challenges to the apportionment process created a burden
upon such board to prove that their election was constitutionally proper. Id. at
253, 229 N.E.2d at 199, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 509.
12. 390 U.S. 474.
13. 83 N.Y.2d 17, 21, 628 N.E.2d 1316, 1318, 607 N.Y.S.2d 606, 608
(1993) (quoting Avery, 390 U.S. at 485).
14. 83 N.Y.2d at 20-21, 628 N.E.2d at 1317, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 607.
15. Id. at 21, 628 N.E.2d at 1317, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 607.
16. Id. at 21, 628 N.E.2d at 1318, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 608.
17. Id.
18. 384 U.S. 73 (1966) (holding that while the use of registered voters was

possibly suspicious it was not constitutionally barred as a means of determining
the population for apportionment purposes).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol10/iss3/10

4

et al.: Apportionment

1994]

APPORTIONMENT

829

one the Constitution forbids, the resulting apportionment base
offends no constitutional bar. .... "19
The Longway court mentioned a case in which the Supreme
Court struck down a State Constitution's provision which
categorically disallowed a segment of one state's transient
population. In Carringtonv. Rash,2 0 the high court invalidated a
portion of the Texas constitution which prohibited all military
personnel who move to that state while serving the country from
exercising their right to vote in that state while enlisted. 2 1 The
Carrington Court sympathized with the burdens placed on the
state in having to determine who is and who is not a rightful
citizen of Texas. However, the Court held that the irrebuttable
presumption that military personnel, who relocated to the state
while in the service, cannot be included in the electoral process,
despite proof that Texas was their new domicile
unconstitutionally interfered with those military persons'
fundamental right to vote. 22 Again, the Longway court noted the
trend toward inclusion where enfranchisement issues were
3
concerned even when concerning transient populations.2
Other federal law to which the Longway court looked to for
guidance included Greenwald v. Board of Advisors of the County
of Sullivan24 In this New York based federal case the district
court held that the inclusion of college students living in group
homes or dormitories as well as others living in group homes,
such as drug rehabilitation centers and federally financed jobs
corps housing provisions, was erroneous and that the population
base should be recounted without these transient residents. 25 The
Greenwald court stated that in its opinion "residence [was] a

19. Id. at 92 (citations omitted).
20. 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
21. Id. at 96.
22. Id.

23. Longway v. Jefferson County Bd. of Supervisors, 83 N.Y.2d 17, 20,
628 N.E.2d 1316, 1317, 607 N.Y.S.2d 606, 607 (1993).
24. 567 F. Supp. 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 742 F.2d 1434 (2d Cir.
1983).
25- Id. at 208.
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matter of state and not federal law."26 Still, the Greenwald court
continued to analyze New York's statutory law regarding
residency and the New York constitutional provisions it found
instructive. The defendants in the Longway case contended that
"Greenwald [was] bad law" and asked the Second Circuit to
27
overturn that decision.
The district court in Greenwald examined the Municipal Home
Rule Law which commands counties to apportion their voter ship
28
population including "residents, citizens, or registered voters."
That court pointed to the fact that the Municipal Home Rule Law
failed to define "resident" and set out to determine whether the
defendant's or plaintiffs' preferred definition should prevail. 29
The New York Constitution article II, Section 4 provides that
"[flor purposes of voting, no person shall be deemed to have
gained or lost a residence by reason of his presence or
absence ... while a student, . . . nor while kept at any
almshouse, or other asylum, or institution,; ... nor while
confined in any public prison." 30 The holding of the Greenwald
-court rests upon the fact that the court interpreted the issue before
it as one upon which this section of the New York Constitution is
relevant. 31 Accordingly, the Greenwald court held that mere
presence in Sullivan County was not enough to establish
residence when the presence of persons was due to fact that they
were students or residents of group home facilities. 32 Rather, the
court held that article II, section 4 of the New York State
Constitution required that transient residents of the county
26. Id. at 207.

27. Longway v. Jefferson County Bd. of Supervisors, 995 F.2d 12, 14 (2d
Cir. 1993).
28. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(a)(13) (McKinney 1993).
29. In Greenwald, the defendant county contented that all those counted in
the federal census were considered residents as the New York statute intended
that term, whereas the plaintiffs contended that transient residents ought not to
be considered residents for the purposes of apportionment population counts
because they do not intend to remain in the county, and therefore have little
stake in the local political process. 567 F. Supp. at 207-09.
30. N.Y. CONST. art. II, § 4.
31. 567 F. Supp. at 208.
32. Id.
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provide proof of intention to remain in order to be considered
residents of the county thereby entitling them to be counted in the
33
population which provides the basis of an apportionment plan.
Thus, residence for the purposes of apportionment, was, in the
34
view of the Greenwaldcourt, synonymous with domicile.
It was precisely that conclusion of statutory interpretation to
which the defendants in Longway object and upon which the
plaintiffs in Longway rely. The Longway court agreed with the
defendants that residents were not the same as domiciliaries and
must not be held to the same requirements before being included
in the population count. 35 The Longvay court pointed out that the
New York Constitutional provisions to which the Greenwald
court referred address the right of citizens of the state to not have
their right to vote interfered with when they leave their
permanent residence to be a student, or temporarily reside in a

hospital or other institution. 36 This state constitutional protection,
the Longway court held, is not the same as a right to be counted
in the calculation of the population base for purposes of
37
apportionment.

The Longway court remained unconvinced by plaintiffs
argument that its own decision in Seaman v. Fedourich38
supported its contentions. 39 The Seaman case held that patients at
33. Id.

34. Id. at 207. The Greenwald court supports this conclusion by pointing
to New York State Constitution article II, § 1 which provides that he who has
"been a resident of this state, and of the county, city and village for three
months next preceding an election" may vote in a New York State election.
The court concluded that the state constitution used the word "resident" as
being analogous to "domiciliary," thus inferring that the state legislature
intended that same interpretation to apply to the term "resident" as it appears
in the Municipal Home Rule Law at issue in that case. Id.
35. Longway v. Jefferson County Bd. of Supervisors, 83 N.Y.2d 17, 22,
628 N.E.2d 1316, 1318, 607 N.Y.S.2d 606, 608 (1993). Therefore, the New
York Court of Appeals in deciding Longway has suggested to the Second
Circuit that Greenwald is, as the defendants contend, bad law and should be
overturned. Id.
36. Id. at 23-24, 628 N.E.2d at 1319, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 609.
37. Id.
38. 16 N.Y.2d 94, 209 N.E.2d 778, 262 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1965).
39. 83 N.Y.2d at 23, 628 N.E.2d at 1319, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 609.
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a state hospital in the municipality in question should be included
in the population count upon which apportionment and electoral
districting was to be conducted. 40 That court further held that in
order to exclude such patients a case by case analysis of each
patient's previous address and location for participation in past
elections must be considered to eliminate the possibility that a
specific patient rightfully belongs included in that population, 4 1
Again, there is evidence of a preference for inclusion of transient
residents in population tabulations; a point observed by the
Longway court as well. 42
The Longway court not only disagreed with plaintiffs assertion
that Seaman supported their contentions, but continued to
outright disagree with the Appellate Division, Third
Department's holding in Davis v. Board of Supervisors of the
County of Clinton43 The Davis court held that felons incarcerated
in the county should have been discounted from the population
tabulation to be used for apportionment because their inclusion
altered the representation of the electoral districts of the
county. 44 The Davis court found that since the Seaman court
required extra investigation before excluding state hospital
patients from population data, it intended mandatory exclusion of
such patients when their rightful residences were not located
within the electoral district in question. 45 However, the Longway
court found that the interpretation of Seaman preferred exclusion
to inclusion, and therefore was a misinterpretation of the Seaman
holding. 46 In fact, this interpretation of Seaman would instill an
affirmative duty upon governmental bodies to justify inclusion of
temporary residents such as those in issue in all of the cases
discussed. 47

40. 16 N.Y.2d at 103-04, 209 N.E.2d at 783, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 451.

41. Id. at 105, 209 N.E.2d at 784, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 452.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

83 N.Y.2d at 23, 628 N.E.2d at 1319, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 609.
28 A.D. 583, 279 N.Y.S.2d 434 (3d Dep't 1967).
Id. at 584, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 436.
Id. at 583, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 436.
83 N.Y.2d at 23, 628 N.E.2d at 1319, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 609.
Id.
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The Longway court concluded its analysis of the certified
question before it by addressing the different interests implicated
by interfering with one's fundamental right to vote and the
inclusion or exclusion of persons from population data used to
reapportion and redistrict. 48 Returning again to the cornerstone
case of Reynolds, the Longway court reminded its audience that
even the Supreme Court recognized the impossibility of
mathematical exactitude when dealing with apportionment and
electoral districting issues. 4 9 Considering that truism and the fact
that different "goals and objectives" are served by apportionment
population tabulations as compared to direct restrictions on
voting the Longway court concluded:
Contrary to the... decision in Greenwald, there is no
requirement in New York's Constitution or in the Municipal
Home Rule Law that obligates a local legislature, in the context
of apportionment, to use the same standards required for voting
purposes, specifically, presence and the intent to
remain.... [E]ven though certain citizens within a given
population may not have the right to vote... that citizen
nevertheless would properly be part of the population base for
50
apportionment purposes.
Thus, the New York Court of Appeals answered the .question
certified to it by the Federal Court of Appeals in the negative
meaning that New York's law does not define "population" so as
to necessarily exclude various transient residents. The trend is
toward inclusion of such temporary residents for the purposes of
tabulating population bases to be used in reapportionment and
redistricting plans and exclusion should be based upon
investigation on a case by case basis and the terms of such
exclusion clearly expressed.

48. Id. at 23-24, 628 N.E.2d at 1319, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 609.
49. Id. at 24, 628 N.E.2d at 1319, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 609 (quoting Reynolds
v.Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964)).
50. Id. at 24-25, 628 N.E.2d at 1320, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 610.
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